The shuffle model of differential privacy (Erlingsson et al. SODA 2019; Cheu et al. EUROCRYPT 2019) and its close relative encode-shuffle-analyze (Bittau et al. SOSP 2017) provide a fertile middle ground between the well-known local and central models.
Introduction
In the shuffle model of differential privacy individuals communicate with an analyzer through a mixer that (potentially) disassociates a message from its sender [2, 6, 4] . Recent work on the shuffle model provides protocols for some basic statistical tasks, demonstrating that the shuffle model allows for improved accuracy, compared with local differential privacy [6, 4, 1, 9, 7, 8] . A recurring task in these papers is real summation, where the task is to approximate the sum of real values x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ [0, 1] held by n users. The results these papers present differ in the accuracy achieved, the number of messages sent by each user, and message length (See Table 1 for details).
Trade-offs of the Shuffle Model
The first protocol for real summation in the shuffle model, presented by Cheu et al. [4] , is a O( √ n)-message protocol with MSE (mean squared error) O(1) where each user produces a unary encoding of their inputs with precision O( √ n) and submits to the shuffler the result of applying independent binary randomized response mechanisms to each of the bits in this representation of the input. The analyzer can just sum the bits submitted by all users and then apply a debiasing operation. We note that while the protocol by Cheu et al. was presented in a model where all messages are sent through a single shuffler, their privacy analysis is based on the composition of several single-message protocols. Therefore an implementation of the protocol in a parallel shuffle model, where multiple shufflers exists and each user sends a single message to each, would attain the same privacy guarantees. 1 Focusing on the setting where each user sends a single message, Balle et al. [1] provided matching upper and lower bounds showing real summation in the single-message shuffle model can be solved with MSE Θ(n 1/3 ). In particular, this result shows that the single message shuffle model sits strictly in-between the local and central models of differential privacy. In terms of techniques, the protocol relies on amplification properties of the shuffle model introduced in [1] (see also [6] ). The intuitive idea underlying this approach is to have clients send, along with their inputs, a set of random messages. The latter get mixed up with the real inputs by the shuffler, providing a "blanketing noise" that hides the contribution of any single user. Although this technique was introduced by Balle et al. [1] in the singlemessage model where each user either contributes their real data or a message from the blanket, it has been later applied by Ghazi et al. [7] also in the multi-message setting.
New Real Summation Protocols
We introduce new protocols for real summation in the shuffle model, improving on the accuracy and communication of previous protocols. Our first contribution is a recursive construction that uses the blanketing technique of Balle et al. The construction is based on the protocol from [1] , which achieved optimal mean squared error of Θ(n 1/3 ) for single message protocols. Our protocol can be viewed as realizing a trade-off between accuracy and the number of messages m sent by each user. The trade-off improves on the error achieved in the single message setting already for m as small as 2 and 3 (where the MSE reduces to O(n 1/9 ) and O(n 1/27 ) respectively), and yields poly(log log n) error with m = O(log log n).
Our second contribution is of a very different flavor. We reduce the problem of differentially private real addition with optimal O(1) MSE to the problem of secure addition over a finite group. The reduction applies finite discretization on the inputs, as well as introduces noise (akin to that added in the Laplace mechanism [5] ) which is added in a distributed manner.
For secure addition over a finite group, we begin with the protocol by Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [12] (to which we refer henceforth as the IKOS protocol). In the setting of the IKOS protocol, n users hold values x 1 , . . . , x n in a finite group Z q and wish to securely compute their sum over Z q . To do so, each user i splits their input x i into m additive secret shares (over Z q ), and sends all shares anonymously to the server via a shuffler. The server hence obtains the shuffled nm shares and reconstructs the result by summing them up. Ishai et al. showed that splitting each value x i into m = O(log q + σ + log n) shares suffices to achieve statistical security parameter σ, in the sense that a (computationally unlimited) server seeing the set of shares submitted by the users cannot distinguish two inputs (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and (x ′ 1 , . . . , x ′ n ) with i x i = i x ′ i , except with advantage 2 −σ . Curiously, with the analysis provided in [12] the number of shares m grows as a function of n. This is in contrast with the intuition that a larger number of participants help any single user's contribution to "hide in the crowd", allowing m to decrease as n grows. The reduction from differentially private real-addition to secure addition over finite groups makes minimizing the number of shares m a question of relevance not only to secure computation but also to understanding the trade-off between accuracy, number of messages sent by each party, and length of these messages in the shuffle model of differential privacy.
We provide a novel analysis of the IKOS protocol, showing that larger n does indeed help to reduce the number of required messages m. We show that for statistical security parameter σ it suffices to take the number of shares to be m = 2σ+log 2 (q) log 2 (n)−log 2 (e) + 2 . As a concrete example, computing the sum of 64-bit numbers with security parameter σ = 80 by n = 10 3 users, our bounds show that 29 messages per party suffice whereas 15 messages per user suffice when n = 10 6 . In both cases, one of the messages can be sent outside the shuffle.
A more detailed account of our results is provided in Section 3, after the formal presentation of the shuffle model.
How the two results compare? Our IKOS-based protocol gives optimal O(1) MSE, which is superior to the poly(log log n) MSE of the recursive protocol. However, there are some considerations that may make the latter sometime preferable. In particular, the recursive protocol can be instantiated with two and three messages, yielding MSE O(n 1/9 ) and O(n 1/27 ) respectively. This shows that there is a concrete advantage of going beyond one message, where the optimal MSE is Θ(n 1/3 ) [1] .In contrast, the analysis of the IKOS-based protocol does not provide any guarantees for such a small number of messages. Furthermore, the IKOS-based protocol is not robust to manipulation by dishonest users. A single user deviating from the protocol execution can bias the result by an arbitrary amount. 2 In comparison, our recursive protocol, does not put as much trust in the users, as the effect that any single dishonest user can have on the final sum is bounded
. It is instructive to compare this result with the recent analysis of manipulation by Cheu et al. [3] , which shows that in the local model of differential privacy, a dishonest users effect on the outcome is of magnitude O(1/ǫ).
Finally, increasing communication has different effects on each of the protocols. Intuitively, for a fixed choice of ǫ, increasing the number of messages per user in the first protocol results in better accuracy, while in the second protocol it results in a smaller value for δ.
Concurrent Independent Work
We mention two works done concurrently and independently of our work which are relevant to this paper. First, independently of our work, Ghazi, Manurangsi, Pagh, and Velingker [9] proposed protocols achieving MSE O(1) with O(log n) messages, using an approach similar to that of the IKOS protocol. Their approach differs from ours in the employed distributed noise aggregation scheme: while Ghazi et al. rely on a similar technique to the one used by Shi et al. [14] , we exploit the infinite divisibility properties of the geometric distribution, as suggested by Goryczka and Xiong [10] . Quantitatively, our noise addition technique makes the error independent of δ, saving a factor of O(log(1/δ)) in the MSE, and our communication complexity is independent of ǫ saving a factor of O(log(1/ǫ)) over [9] .
In a follow up work, Ghazi, Manurangsi, Pagh, and Velingker have, concurrently and independently of our work, obtained an analysis of the IKOS protocol that provides guarantees for a constant number of messages [8] . Interestingly, their result gives the same communication cost as our analysis (up to constant factors), but the proof techniques are different. In particular, while at its core our result involves an analysis of the distribution of connected components in a certain family of random graphs, their analysis is based on properties of the rank of a certain family of random matrices. A key difference between both approaches is that ours allows the secure summation protocol to operate over a finite group Z q with no constraints on q, while in principle theirs only works over finite fields because otherwise the relevant concepts from linear algebra (e.g. rank) are not defined. Moreover, our analysis tracks constants, and thus yields concrete privacy parameters.
The Shuffle Model of Differential Privacy
This section formally defines the shuffle model used throughout the paper. This model provides privacy-preserving protocols for computing aggregate statistics using data held by users. The data is privatized and sent to a data collector for analysis through a trusted communication channel that randomly shuffles the messages of many users together. We start by recalling the definition of differential privacy, proceed to introduce the shuffle functionality together with the rest of the ingredients necessary to specify a protocol in this model, define the semantics of the shuffled model used in this paper, and conclude by discussing related models.
Central and Local Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is a formal model providing strong individual privacy guarantees for data analysis tasks [5] . A randomized mechanism M : X n → O satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP if for any pair of inputs x and x ′ differing in a single coordinate (we denote this relation by x ≃ x ′ ) and any (measurable) event E ⊆ O on the output space we have
In words: changing the data of one individual (among the n contributing their data for analysis) does not significantly affect the probability distribution over outputs of the mechanism.
In this standard definition of differential privacy the mechanism has direct access to the data about n individuals. Such data might be stored in a database curated by the party executing the mechanism, whose output is then released to the world. This is generally referred to as the central (or curator ) model, and an implicit trust assumption is made that the curator will keep the database secret and only the outputs of DP mechanisms executed on the data will be released.
The local model of differential privacy [13] considers a subclass of all DP mechanisms which operate under the assumption that each user applies randomness to privatize their own data before sending it to (a potentially untrusted) aggregator for analysis. In a noninteractive setting where the aggregator receives the data from all users at the same time, mechanisms are specified in terms of a local randomizer 3 R : X → Y and an analyzer A : Y n → O, and output the result M R,A ( x) = A(R(x 1 ), . . . , R(x n )). In this case the privacy guarantees of the mechanism are measured with respect to the view of the aggregator: M R,A is (ǫ, δ)-DP if for any x ≃ x ′ and any event E ⊆ Y n we have
where R( x) = (R(x 1 ), . . . , R(x n )).
Shufflers and Multi-sets
A shuffler S : Y n → Y n is a randomized mechanism that returns the result of applying a uniform random permutation of [n] to its inputs. The shuffling operation "erases" all the information about the positions each particular message occupied in the input. From an information-theoretic perspective this is equivalent to a deterministic mechanism F : Y n → N Y n that outputs the multi-set of entries in an n-tuple (i.e. forgets about the order in which the inputs were provided). This can be made formal by observing that the output of S( x) can be used to simulate the output of F ( x) and vice versa. Consequently, these two equivalent points of view on the action performed by the shuffler will be used interchangeably throughout the paper.
The Shuffle Model
The shuffle model of differential privacy [6, 4] considers a data collector that receives messages from n users (possibly multiple messages from each user). The key distinctive feature of the shuffle model is the assumption that a mechanism is in place to provide anonymity to each of the messages, i.e., in the data collector's view, the messages have been shuffled by a random unknown permutation. The concrete formulation of the shuffle model used in this paper is as follows (variants of this model are discussed below).
An m-message protocol in the shuffle model is specified by a pair of algorithms P = (R, A), where R : X → Y m , and A : (Y n ) m → O, for a number of users n > 1 and number of messages m ≥ 1. We call R the local randomizer, X the input space, Y the message space of the protocol, A the analyzer of P, and O the output space.
The randomized mechanism M P : X n → O defined by the protocol P is defined as follows. Each user i holds a data record x i , to which they apply the local randomizer to obtain a vector of messages y i = (y
, to transmit their messages to the data collector; the jth message of each user is sent via the jth shuffler. The data collector receives the outputs of the m shufflers y (j) = S (j) (y (j) 1 , . . . , y (j) n ), j ∈ [m], and processes them using the analyzer to obtain the output of the protocol M P ( x) = A( y (1) , . . . , y (m) ) on inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). This is illustrated in Figure 1 .
From a privacy standpoint the data collector might have incentives to look at the outputs of the shufflers to obtain information about some user's input. On the other hand, the shufflers are assumed to be fully trusted black-boxes free from any snooping or interference. Thus, while the output of the protocol is the result of applying the analyzer to the shuffled messages, the privacy of such a protocol is formulated directly in terms of the view of the data collector V P ( x) = ( y (1) , . . . , y (m) ) containing the tuples produced by the m shufflers. In particular, the protocol will provide privacy to individuals if for any pair of inputs x and x ′ differing in a single coordinate the views V P ( x) and V P ( x ′ ) of the data collector are indistinguishable in the standard sense of differential privacy.
Note that the definition of view allows us to write the mechanism as the composition M P = A • V P , and by the post-processing property of differential privacy the definition above implies that M P is an (ǫ, δ)-DP mechanism in the standard sense. This definition also Analyzer A Shuffler S (j) Shuffler S (1) Shuffler S (m) Figure 1 : In the shuffle model, each local randomizer sends one message to each of m independent shufflers. provides a clear parallelism between the shuffle model and the (non-interactive) local model of differential privacy: in the latter the view of the data collector is the tuple of messages produced by each user ( y 1 , . . . , y n ) and it is this view that is required to be differentially private. In the shuffle model the view of the data collector is obtained from the view in the local model after the additional randomization step introduced by the shufflers. Quantifying the additional privacy provided by the shuffling step is one of the central questions in the shuffle model, which has given rise to a number of privacy amplification statements (both in implicit and explicit form) [6, 4, 1] . Broadly speaking, these results show that, in the one message (m = 1) case, if the protocol (x 1 , . . . , x n ) → (R(x 1 ), . . . , R(x n )) satisfies ǫ 0 -DP, then after shuffling the resulting protocol satisfies (ǫ, δ)-DP with ǫ = O(min{1, ǫ 0 }e ǫ 0 log(1/δ)/n). In particular, this implies that ǫ 0 = O(1) yield shuffled protocols with ǫ = O δ (1/ √ n) and ǫ 0 ≤ log( √ n) yields ǫ = O δ (1).
Observations About the Model
A number of variations on the concrete model described above could be considered. Each of these raises one or more subtleties which we now discuss to further motivate the model used throughout the paper.
Single shuffler protocols. Instead of m parallel shufflers one can consider m-message protocols where the mn messages contributed by all the users are shuffled together using a single shuffler. From a privacy standpoint the single shuffler setting can provide additional privacy because, unlike in the case of parallel shufflers, the data collector cannot in general identify a group of n messages containing at least one message from a given user i. This additional privacy gain, however, can only be realized when the m messages generated by a user's local randomizer play "exchangeable" roles in the computation performed by the analyzer (e.g. when the messages are summed). This is the case, for example, for the multimessage protocol by Cheu et al. [4] for summation of inputs x i ∈ [0, 1] using a single shuffler.
On the other hand, for the protocol we present in Section 4 it is crucial to apply a different debiasing operations to the messages coming from each of the shufflers. We also note that our setting with m parallel shufflers can be trivially simulated using a single shuffler where the m messages contributed by each user come with a label j ∈ [m] that enables the data collector to recover the message grouping after shuffling. But even in cases where this simulation is a viable solution, there still exists a relevant distinction in terms of the assumed threat model which might make the parallel shuffler implementation more preferable: in the single shuffler setting an attacker only needs to compromise one shuffler to collect all the messages submitted by a given user, while in the parallel shuffler setting an attacker needs to compromise m independent shufflers to obtain this same level of access.
User-dependent randomizers. The model used in this paper assumes every user applies the same local randomizer to their data. This could be relaxed by letting each user employ a different randomizer. However, when used in its full generality this relaxation can lead to protocols where no privacy gains are obtained from the shuffling step. For example, in a protocol where the output domain of the randomizer of each user is disjoint from the output domains of the rest of randomizers. Note that each individual local randomizer can still provide local differential privacy in this case, but after shuffling it is possible to re-identify which messages were submitted by which user, so there is no privacy amplification coming from shuffling.
Interactive shuffle model. The work of Erlingsson et al. [6] considers a more general shuffle model where each user's data can be processed by a different randomizer in a potentially adaptive fashion. This is achieved by significantly strengthening the trust assumptions on the shuffler, which now becomes an interactive intermediary between the analyzer and the users. In particular, in the interactive shuffle model users submit their data in plain text to the shuffler, who applies a random permutation to it, and then provides answers to a sequence of queries from the analyzer in the form of local randomizers which are applied to the next permuted data record. The sequence of randomizers provided by the analyzer can depend adaptively on previous answers. In this model, an attacker compromising the shuffler can, in principle, gain access to the plain-text data from the users -while in the non-interactive model the users at least get some level of local differential privacy -although some cryptographic constructions can be used to mitigate such risks [2] . On the other hand, interactivity enables more complex computations which cannot be implemented in a single round non-interactive protocol (e.g. mini-batch stochastic gradient descent).
Private Summation in the Shuffle Model
In this paper we are concerned with the problem of real summation where each user i holds a real number x i ∈ [0, 1] and the goal of the protocol is for the analyser to obtain a differentially private estimate of n i=1 x i . For each such protocol P we are interested in quantifying the Reference MSE Num. messages Cheu et al. [4] O Table 1 : Comparison of protocols for real summation in the shuffle protocol.
final accuracy in terms of the worst-case mean squared error (MSE) defined as
where the expectation is over the randomness in the protocol. In some cases (e.g. Section 4) we will use as building blocks summation protocols over different domains X ⊂ R or X ⊂ Z.
For such protocols the definition of MSE is modified by replacing the supremum over x ∈ [0, 1] n to a supremum over x ∈ X n .
Recall that in the curator model of differential privacy the Laplace mechanism provides an ε-DP mechanism for the problem of real summation with MSE O ε (1) and this is optimal. On the other hand, the optimal MSE under ε-DP in the local model is O ε (n). Real summation in the shuffle model raises interesting trade-offs between accuracy and communication, where the latter can be quantified both in terms of number of messages per user and size of these messages (in number of bits). Known results for this problem together with the new contributions in this work are summarized in Table 1 . We now give a technical overview of our contributions.
Our Results
Our main contributions are two new protocols for real summation in the shuffle model with improved accuracy and communication over prior work. The two protocols are very different in nature. One is based on a recursive application of the optimal one message protocol from [1] with a carefully designed finite-precision numeric representation scheme. The second protocol uses a novel analysis of a reduction from secure summation to multimessage shuffling based on random additive shares given in [12] to simulate an optimal protocol in the central model using distributed noise.
Recursive protocol. The recursive protocol (Section 4) provides a trade-off between accuracy and number of messages: given m messages and fixed privacy parameters ǫ and δ, the protocol with n users achieves MSE O(n 3 −m (1 + m 3 )). In particular, this yields protocols with MSE O(n 1/9 ), O(n 1/27 ) and O(log log 3 n) for m = 2, 3, ⌈log log n⌉ messages respectively.
To give an overview of the recursive protocol we first recall that an optimal protocol for the one-message case (cf. [1] ) can be constructed by fixing a precision p ∈ N, p = O(n 1/3 ), and letting each user i apply to their input x i ∈ [0, 1] a randomized response mechanism that with some probability γ = O(n −2/3 ) returns a uniform value in {0, . . . , p} and with probability 1 − γ returns ⌊px i ⌋ + Ber(px i − ⌊px i ⌋), the unbiased randomized rounding of x i to precision p. The values of p and γ are obtained by optimizing the trade-off between the error introduced by the rounding step and the error induced by the privacy-preserving randomized response step.
Our first protocol extends this approach to the setting where each user sends m messages. The key idea is to capitalize on the privacy provided by shuffling the result of a randomized response mechanism by devising an encoding scheme for x ∈ [0, 1] into m fixed-precision numbers and apply a randomized response mechanism to each of these numbers independently. The encoding proceeds as follows: we take a sequence of precisions p 1 , . . . , p m ∈ N with p 1 = O(n 3 −m ) and p j+1 = ⌈p 1/3 j ⌉, define the products q j = j l=1 p l , and approximate the input as
with s j = ⌊q j x − p j ⌊q j−1 x⌋⌋ and q 0 = 0. Applying a randomized rounding step to the last message s m yields an unbiased random approximation of the original input. Given such a representation of their input, a user then applies randomized response mechanisms to each of the s j to either submit the true message with probability 1 − γ j or a uniform value in {0, . . . , p j } with probability γ j = O(p j /n). Upon receiving the messages from all users, the analyzer performs debiasing and summation operations to obtain the final result.
In our analysis of the protocol each message is allocated the same privacy budget and the final privacy analysis follows from the standard composition properties of differential privacy applied to the privacy analysis of the one-message protocol which relies on privacy amplification by shuffling. The parameters p j and γ j are chosen to optimize the error contributions due to privacy and rounding as discussed in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Refining this analysis using the advanced composition theorem leads to the result with O((log log n) 2 ) MSE and O(log log n) messages referenced in Table 1 (Corollary 4.1).
IKOS protocol. The IKOS protocol (Section 6) uses a constant number of messages to achieve the same asymptotic error as optimal mechanisms in the curator model. The main idea behind the protocol is to leverage the reduction from secure summation to multi-message shuffling of Ishai et al. [12] in order to obtain a distributed implementation of a (discretized) Laplace mechanism using constant variance noise. Getting this idea to work required us to overcome a number of technical difficulties, including a significant strengthening of the reduction in [12] which in its original form only gives a summation protocol with constant MSE by using a logarithmic number of messages as discussed in Section 5.
The reduction in [12] provides a protocol P where n users, each holding an integer x i ∈ Z q , i ∈ [n], use m independent shufflers to securely compute i x i . This is achieved by letting each user generate m additive shares of their input, i.e. a tuple y i ∈ Z m q of m uniform random elements from Z q conditioned on j y (j) i = x i , and send the shares to a data collector using m independent shufflers. By adding the shares received from all the shufflers, the data collector can exactly compute the sum of the inputs. The result of Ishai et al. is a security claim stating that if x, x ′ ∈ Z n q are input tuples with the same sum, i x i = i x ′ i , then the views V P ( x) and V P ( x ′ ) of the data collector in the two executions are indistinguishable in the sense that TV(V P ( x), V P ( x ′ )) ≤ 2 −σ for some number of messages m = O(log(qn) + σ). One of our main technical contributions is an improved analysis of this reduction showing that the same security guarantees can be achieved with the much smaller number of messages m = O(1 + log(q)+σ log(n) ). Equipped with this improved reduction to perform secure summation in Z q in the multimessage shuffle model with low communication, we construct a simulation of the optimal ε-DP real summation protocol M( x) = i x i + Lap(1/ε) by discretizing the input to a large enough abelian finite group Z q and distributing the noise addition step across the n users involved in the protocol. This is achieved by leveraging the observation from [10] showing that the discrete Laplace distribution over Z with distribution P[k] ∝ α −|k| (i.e. the two-sided geometric distribution) is infinitely divisible, and therefore it is possible to obtain samples from this distribution by summing n i.i.d. samples from some fixed distribution (in this case, the one obtained by taking the difference between two Pólya random variables). Since the secure summation protocol only works in a finite group, the users of our real summation protocol first discretize their inputs x i ∈ [0, 1] to integers with precision p = O( √ n), then add their share of the noise, and finally truncate the result modulo q = O(n 3/2 ). These parameter choices ensure that (i) the errors due to noise and discretization are of the same order of magnitude, and (ii) with high probability, there is enough space in the group to represent the noisy sum without overflows.
Putting the secure summation protocol together with the discretized distributed noise addition technique yields a protocol for private summation in the multi-message shuffle model. The privacy guarantees of this protocol follow from bounding its total variation distance from the discretized summation protocol with truncated discrete Laplace noise in the curator model (Lemma C.2). Thus, the protocol has MSE O(1) like the optimal protocol in the curator model, and uses O(1) messages per user by virtue of our analysis of the summation to shuffling reduction. Public Parameters: γ and number of parties n Input:
if x = 0.2342 and p = 10, the local randomizer submits 2 + Ber(0.342) with probability 1 − γ, and a uniformly random value in {0, . . . , p} with probability γ. Here, the error of the fixed-point encoding due to the choice of p needs to be balanced with the error due to the randomized response procedure. On one hand, γ needs to grow with p, hence, for a fixed choice of privacy parameters, the larger p is the less often the true value will be reported. On the other hand, the error due to discretization decreases with p, as it corresponds to the precision in the fixed-point encoding.
In this section we show how to do better if we are allowed more messages. As before, assume that we choose the precision of our first message to be p 1 = 10. Then, the fixed-point encoding of x = 0.2342 is 2 and this has an error of 0.0342, as before. Instead of applying a randomized rounding step as in the single-message case, we can just apply a randomized response of the value 2, with domain {0, . . . , 10} and probability γ 1 and recursively apply the same idea to the residual value 0.0342. For example, if we choose p 2 = 100, and we are limited to just two messages, then the second message will be the randomized response of 34+Ber(0.2) with domain {0, . . . , 100}, and probability γ 2 . In summary, we recursively apply the single-message procedure on the error of the fixed-point encoding of the current message, and randomized rounding in the last message, as the base case. This corresponds to choosing precisions p 1 , p 2 , . . . and probabilities γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . to, analogously to the single-message case, achieve a good balance between privacy and accuracy.
The m-message recursive summation protocol is defined by P rec γ, p,n = (R rec γ, p , A rec γ, p,n ). The local randomizer is shown in Algorithm 3. The algorithm takes a sequence of precisions
Public Parameters: Number of shufflers m, vector of precisions p ∈ N m , and vector of randomized response probabilities γ ∈ [0, 1] m . Also, let q j = j l=1 p l and q 0 = 0.
. . , p m and probabilities γ 1 , . . . , γ m . We also define q j = j l=1 p l for simplicity. The algorithm consists of m executions of a discrete summation protocol (Algorithms 1 and 2), where the jth message is the fixed-point encoding (with precision p j ) of the error up to message j due to fixed-point encoding in previous messages, and the last message includes randomized rounding. This achieves the same goal than in the single-message protocol, i.e. obtain an unbiased estimate of the sum. The respective analyzers are given in Algorithms 4 and 2 and only involve a standard debiasing step, and summation.
Let us first focus on the discrete summation subprotocol P γ,p,n = (R γ,p , A γ,p,n ). Theorem 1 of [1] states that this protocol is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private in the shuffle model, so long as ǫ ≤ 1 and γ ≥ max 14p log(2/δ) (n−1)ǫ 2 , 27p (n−1)ǫ . The mean squared error on the result is O ǫ,δ (p 3 ), which is optimal for summation in {0, . . . , p} up to constants. This bound is given in (the proof of) Theorem 2 from [1] as follows.
To understand the privacy guarantees of the recursive algorithm first note that the privacy budget must be split over the different shufflers. It satisfies any differential privacy guarantee that is satisfied by the composition of m copies of Algorithm 1 run with parameters γ j , p j and n. The condition ǫ ≤ m could be relaxed by a constant factor at only a constant factor cost to the given bounds, it follows from the assumption ǫ ≤ 1 made in the single-message case to simplify the analysis. The following theorem, which we will prove next, states the main result of this section: O(log log n) messages suffice to achieve MSE O((log log n) 3 ). In particular, for m = ⌊log 3 (log 2 (n))⌋ and p j = 2 3 j we get
The above theorem uses basic composition, using advanced composition gives the following corollary which follows from much the same proof. The asymptotics in n are better by a factor of log log n, however this comes at the cost of a log(1/δ) factor and so in practice the basic composition analysis might be preferred depending on the concrete values of the parameters involved. (2)
Proof of Theorem 4.2
We start by proving the following lemma on the error that the protocol incurs, which gives a bounds on the MSE of the real summation protocol in terms of bounds on the MSE of the discrete summation subroutines we viewed as standalone summation protocols for inputs on {0, . . . , p j } n . Proof. Note in the local randomizer that j s j /q j is an unbiased estimate of x i with variance equal to the variance of r divided by q 2 m which is at most 1/(4q 2 m ). Summing this noise over all local randomizers gives mean squared error n/(4q 2 m ). The contribution of the call to the non recursive local randomizer on s j is scaled by the corresponding 1/q j providing the sum in the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. For γ j = 14(p j +I j=m ) log(2/δ j ) (n−1)ε 2 j , so long as 14 log(2/δ j ) ≥ 27ε j , Theorem 4.1 and basic composition imply that the recursive protocol is ( j ε j , j δ j )-differentially private (ǫ ≤ m implies ǫ j ≤ 1). The condition 14 log(2/δ j ) ≥ 27ǫ j follows immediately from log(1/δ) ≥ 2ǫ. As δ j = δ and ǫ j = ǫ this protocol is as private as required. To explain where the choices of p j and ǫ j come from we provide the analysis to choose them as a part of the accuracy proof. Neglecting log(1/δ) factors and using the accuracy estimates of Theorem 4.1 combined with Lemma 4.1, we get:
We will minimize this expression by optimizing the p j over the real numbers for simplicity, then rounding to integers turns out not to affect the asymptotics. Differentiating with respect to p l , for l ∈ [m], gives
Setting this equal to zero and re-arranging gives
Dividing this result for two consecutive values of l gives
and thus
Finding an ǫ, for fixed p, that minimizes the above expression for the MSE gives
Combining this with Equation 3 we get that ǫ l = ǫ l−1 , and substituting into Equation 3 gives p l = p 3 l−1 . We thus take ǫ l = ǫ/m as stated in the theorem and write p l as a 3 l . Note that
Choosing a to minimize this gives a = (3 m −1)nǫ 2
Remark 4.1. We note that if we allow the constant a in the proof to take any real value the upper bound is still of order (log log n) 3 . So better parameter choices can't get us all the way to constant error with this analysis. Using advanced composition in place of basic still fails to achieve a constant upper bound. We therefore believe this algorithm incurs super-constant error for any privacy preserving choice of parameters.
In the next section we show a protocol that achieves constant error with a constant number of messages m, for large enough n. However, it requires m > 3, while the protocol presented in this section achieves MSE at most O ǫ,δ (n 1/9 ) and O ǫ,δ (n 1/27 ) with 2 and 3 messages, respectively. This is in contrast with the Ω(n 1/3 ) lower bound for the single message case proved in [1] .
Constant Error from Secure Summation
Extending the ideas from single message summation has failed to achieve an error that doesn't grow with n. In this section we take an alternative approach that will. They key idea is to leverage a secure summation protocol in the shuffle model due to Ishai et al. [12] . This protocol can be used to simulate (a discrete version of) the Laplace mechanismwhich provides O(1) MSE in the central model -in the shuffle model. We will first define the secure summation functionality, and then provide our result in the form of a reduction from private summation to secure summation that preserves the number of messages being shuffled. Combining this reduction with the result from [12] we obtain a private summation protocol in the shuffle model with MSE O(1) using O(log n) messages. In the next section we provide an improved analysis of secure summation that yields a protocol using only O(1) messages.
Secure Exact Summation
Let G be an Abelian group and P = (R, A) be a protocol in the shuffle model with input and output space G. We say that P computes exact summation if for any x ∈ G n we have
Such a protocol is deemed secure if the view of the aggregator on input x is indistinguishable from the view on another input x ′ producing the same output. More formally, we say that a randomized protocol P computing exact summation over G provides worst-case statistical security with parameter σ if for any x, x ′ ∈ G n , such that i∈ [n] 
where TV denotes the total variation (i.e. statistical) distance.
The following result from [12] provides an upper bound on the number of messages required to compute exact summation securely in the shuffle model. ) and all the analyzer needs to do is sum the messages after shuffling to recover the sum
i . The original presentation in [12] assumes all nm messages are shuffled together -i.e. it is in the single-shuffler model discussed in Section 2.4 -but as the results in Section 6 will show, the protocol also works in the m-parallel shufflers model considered in this paper. We refer to this as the IKOS secure exact summation protocol, which is σ-secure as stated in the lemma.
We reproduce their proof in Section B, so that we can keep track of the constants. There we show that in fact it suffices to take m = 5 2 log(q) + σ + log(n − 1)
Distributed Noise Addition
The challenge to simulate the Laplace mechanism assuming a secure summation protocol in the shuffle model is to distribute the noise addition operation across n users. A simple solution is to have a designated user add the noise required in the curator model. This is however not a satisfying solution as it does not withstand collusions and/or dropouts. To address this, Shi et al. [14] proposed a solution where each party adds enough noise to provide ǫ-DP in the curator model with probability log(1/δ)/n, which results in an (ǫ, δ)-DP protocol. However, one can do strictly better: the total noise can be reduced by a factor of log(1/δ). To achieve this each party adds a discrete random variable such that the sum of the contributions is exactly enough to provide ǫ-DP.
A discrete random variable with this property is provided in [10] , where it is shown that a discrete Laplace random variable can be expressed as the sum of n differences of two Pólya random variables (the Pólya distribution is a generalization of the negative binomial distribution). Concretely, if X i and Y i are independent Polya(1/n, α) random variables then Z = n i=1 (X i − Y i ) follows a discrete Laplace distribution DLap(α) on Z, i.e. P[Z = k] ∝ α |k| . This allows to distribute the noise in the Laplace mechanism across n users and achieve ǫ-DP on the result of the sum by tuning α appropriately.
This discrete noise distribution forms the basis of the randomizer of the protocol presented in the next section. When designing the protocol we will need to take care of working in the finite group Z q instead of Z, and thus analyze the potential effect on accuracy arising from overflows in the unlikely event that the noise becomes too large.
Private Summation
In this section we prove a reduction in the shuffle model for converting a secure integer summation protocol into a differentially private real summation protocol. We then combine this lemma with Lemma 5.1 to derive an explicit protocol for differentially private real summation. The privacy argument relies on leveraging the security properties of the IKOS summation protocol to compare the outputs of our private summation protocol in the shuffle model with a protocol in the central model where the noise is added to the sum of all the inputs and then an execution of the IKOS protocol is simulated. Proof. Let Π = (R Π , A Π ) be the secure exact summation protocol. We will exhibit the resulting protocol P = (R, A), with R = R Π •R and A =Ã • A Π , whereR andÃ are defined as follows. P executes Π with q = ⌈2n 3/2 ⌉, and thusR : [0, 1] → Z ⌈2n 3/2 ⌉ .R(x i ) is the result of first computing a randomized fixed-point encoding of the input x with precision p = √ n, then adding noise Z i ∼ Polya(1/n, e −ǫ/p ) − Polya(1/n, e −ǫ/p ) in Z and taking the result modulo q.Ã decodes z by returning (z − q)/p if z > 3np 2 , and z/p otherwise. This addresses potential over/under-flows of the sum in Z q .
To show that this protocol is private we will compare the view V P to another mechanism M C (which can be considered to be computed in the curator model) which is ǫ-DP and such that TV(V P ( x), M C ( x)) ≤ 2 −σ for all x, from which the result follows by Lemma C.2.
M C ( x) is defined to be the result of the following procedure. First applyR to each input x i , then take the sum s = n i=1R (x i ) and output V Π (s, 0, . . . , 0), the view of the aggregator in the protocol Π with first input s and all other inputs 0.
Note that s = n i=1 fp(x i , p) + DLap(α) with α = e −ǫ/p , where we define the randomized rounding operation fp(x, p) = ⌊xp⌋ + Ber(xp − ⌊xp⌋). The worst-case sensitivity of n i=1 fp(x i , p) under the change of one x i is p. It follows that s is ǫ-DP and thus by the post processing property so is M C .
It remains to show that TV(V P ( x), M C ( x)) ≤ 2 −σ , which we will do by demonstrating the existence of a coupling. First let the noise added to input x i byR be the same in both Algorithm 5: Analyzer A n,m,p,q
Public Parameters: Number of parties n, number of messages per party m, precision p and order q > np of the additive group.
then z ← z − q ⊲ Correct for underflow return z/p ⊲ Rescale and return estimate mechanisms and note that this results in the inputs to the randomizers from Π used in P and M C to have the same sum. It then follows immediately from the worst-case statistical security assumption that the executions of the randomizers and shufflers in V P and M C can be coupled to have identical outputs except with probability 2 −σ , as required.
Next we show that M P has MSE O ǫ (1). The mean squared error incurred by randomized rounding is bounded by n/(4p 2 ) by Lemma C.1. The discrete Laplace distribution DLap(α) has mean zero and variance 2α/(1 − α) 2 , so rescaling by p gives a mean squared error of 2α/p 2 (1 − α) 2 . Summing these two terms would give the exact mean squared error if our arithmetic was in Z, however we are in Z q and so need to account for the possibility of under/overflowing. The worst-case mean squared error is bounded by (q/p) 2 , and the probability of under/overflow bounded by α q−np 2 so the following expression is a bound on the mean squared error:
Note that the second and third terms can be made arbitrarily small at the expense of more communication by increasing p and q.
The choice p = √ n was made so that the error in the discretization was the same order as the error due to the noise added, and this recovers the same order MSE as the curator model. Taking p = ω( √ n) results in the leading term of the total MSE still matching the curator model at the cost of a small constant factor increase to communication.
Combining Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2 we can conclude the following theorem. Such a protocol can be constructed from the proofs of these lemmas and is given explicitly by taking the local randomiser R α,m,p,q given in Algorithm 6, and the analyzer A n,m,p,q given in Algorithm 5, with parameters p = √ n, q = ⌈2np⌉, α = e −ǫ/p and m as in Equation 4.
Communication Efficient Secure Summation
Next we provide a refined analysis of the statistical security provided by the IKOS secure summation protocol. Our analysis works for the parallel shuffle model version of the protocol, which is a weaker assumption than the single-shuffler protocol considered in the original analysis (cf. Section 2.4).
Since the aggregator in the IKOS protocol is just summation of all messages, throughout this section we identify a protocol with the corresponding view of the aggregator for simplicity. Accordingly, we identify the m-parallel IKOS protocol over G with the randomized map V m,n : G n → (G n ) m obtained as the view of the aggregator in an m-message protocol in the shuffle model with randomizer R m :
). The first result we prove uses the following weaker security notion compared to the worstcase definition from Section 5.1. We say that a randomized protocol V with domain G n provides average-case statistical security with parameter σ if we have E X, X ′ [TV | X, X ′ (V( X), V( X ′ ))] ≤ 2 −σ , where X and X ′ are n-tuples of uniform random elements from G conditioned on i∈[n] X i = i∈[n] X ′ i , and TV | X, X ′ denotes the total variation distance when the inputs are fixed (i.e. over the randomness coming from the protocol). provided that σ ≥ 1, m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 19.
While the above theorem only states average-case security, a simple randomization trick recovers worst-case security at the cost of one extra message per party (see Section 6.2). Moreover, such a message does not need to be shuffled. This corresponds to a small variation on the parallel IKOS protocol where one of the messages contributed by each user is not sent through a shuffler; i.e. it is possible to unequivocally associate one of the messages from the input to each user.
We define the m-parallel IKOS protocol with randomized inputs over G as the randomized mapṼ m,n : G n → (G n ) m+1 obtained as follows. Let S (j) : G n → G n , j ∈ [m], be m independent shufflers. For any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ G n define the random variables (Y
, obtained by sampling m + 1 additive shares for each input. Then, the IKOS protocol with randomized inputs returns, for j ∈ [m], the result of independently shuffling the jth shares of all the users together, concatenated with the m + 1th unshuffled shares:
Corollary 6.1. The protocolṼ m,n provides worst-case statistical security with parameter σ given by the same expression as in Theorem 6.1 as long as m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 19. Thus, for fixed n, q and σ, it suffices, for worst-case security, to take the number of shuffled messages to be m = 2σ + log 2 (q) log 2 (n) − log 2 (e) + 1 .
Therefore m need not be taken to grow as n goes to infinity as in Lemma 5.1. In fact, it turns out a larger n results in each person having to send fewer messages. This can be intuitively understood as a greater number of people providing a greater amount of "cover" to hide in the crowd.
Plugging this result into the private summation protocol from the previous section leads to our main result, which removes the log(n) factor from the number of messages submitted by each party. 
Proof Outline
We now provide an outline of the proof of Theorem 6.1. The details can be found in the Appendix. In this proof we will provide forward references to the required lemmas where we use them.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Lemma A.3 in Section A.1 says that protocol V = V m,n provides statistical security with distance bounded by the following expression:
where E is an event specified in Section A.1 that relates two independent executions of V with the same (random) inputs. To bound the probability of event E, Section A.2 defines a probability distribution over a certain class of multigraphs. Lemma A.4 then says that if G is drawn from this distribution and C(G) is the number of connected components in G, then
This expectation is then bounded in Lemma A.5, which says that, if n ≥ 19, m ≥ 3 and q ≤ 1 2 n e m−1 ,
Note that the condition required on q here is implied by
and thus follows from the condition in the theorem that σ ≥ 1.
Putting this together we get average case statistical security less than or equal to q(e/n) m−1 . Thus we have average case statistical security 2 −σ for σ = (m − 1)(log 2 (n) − log 2 (e)) − log 2 (q) 2 .
Reduction to Random Inputs
Here we prove Corollary 6.1 from Theorem 6.1 by showing that a certain level of average-case security with m messages implies the same level of worst-case security with m + 1 messages.
In addition, we show that the additional message required to reduce worst-case security to average-case security does not need to be sent through a shuffler. Note that the expression for the required m in Corollary 6.1 is a simple rearrangement of the expression for σ, so the following lemma is all that remains to be proven. Lemma 6.1. If V m,n provides average-case statistical security with parameter σ, then V m+1,n andṼ m,n provide worst-case statistical security with parameter σ.
Proof. Fix a pair of inputs x and x ′ with the same sum. Since the output of V m+1,n ( x) can be simulated directly from the output ofṼ m,n ( x) by applying a random permutation to the last n elements, we have TV(V m+1,n ( x), V m+1,n ( x ′ )) ≤ TV(Ṽ m,n ( x),Ṽ m,n ( x ′ )), and therefore it suffices to show thatṼ m,n provides worst-case statistical security with parameter σ.
The key observation that allows us to reduce the worst-case security ofṼ m,n to the average-case security of V m,n ( x) is to observe that the addition of an extra share can be interpreted as adding a random value to each user's input, effectively making the inputs uniformly random. To formalize this intuition we observe that R m admits a recursive decomposition as follows. Let U ∈ G be a uniformly random group element and x ∈ G. Then we have R 1 (x) = x and, for m ≥ 1,
Expanding this identity into the definition ofṼ and writing U = (U 1 , . . . , U n ) for the uniform random variables arising from applying the above expression for R m+1 to the input from each user, we obtainṼ
Note that here x− U is a uniform random vector in G n . The result now follows from matching the uniform randomness from U observed when executing the protocol with two inputs with the same sum:
where X and X ′ are tuples with n uniformly random group elements conditioned on i X i = i X ′ i .
Discussion
We have presented two protocols resulting from two different approaches to real summation in the shuffle model of differential privacy. The first protocol achieves MSE as small as O((log log n) 2 ), and to do so requires each user to send O(log log n) messages of size O(log n) each. The second protocol achieves constant error, and to do so only requires a constant number of messages per user. The first protocol uses the blanketing idea from Balle et al. [1] , while the second protocol relies on a reduction from secure discrete summation to shuffling by Ishai et al. [12] . In fact, the core of our contribution in the design of the second protocol is in the improved analysis of such reduction, which is of independent interest from a secure computation perspective. The fact that the ideas behind the two protocols are so different has interesting implications worth discussing, as the two results complement each other in interesting ways.
Breaking the O(n 1/3 ) barrier. Previous works by Balle et al. [1] and Cheu et al. [4] show that with a single message one could achieve MSE Θ(n 1/3 ), and O(n 1/2 ) messages where enough to achieve error O(1). Our work reduces this gap in several ways: first, we showed that the IKOS protocol with the proof technique proposed by Ishai et al. in the original paper leads to a protocol where O(log n) messages are enough to achieve constant error. Next, we further improve on that by providing an alternative proof which resolves affirmatively the question of whether a constant number of messages is enough to achieve constant error for summation in the shuffle model. Moreover, our proof tracks constants, which allows us to provide concrete bounds on the number of messages required to achieve constant error, for given values of n, ǫ and δ. However, this result assumes that the number of messages per user is at least 3, and thus does not address the question of whether 2 messages are enough to break the lower bound by Balle et al. The recursive protocol, on the other hand, allows to trade accuracy by number of messages, and resolves this question affirmatively: the twomessage variant of this protocol has MSE O(n 1/9 ). Whether that upper bound is tight is an open question.
Robustness against adversarial behaviour. An important difference between our two protocols is their ability to withstand adversarial users that might deviate from the prescribed protocol execution to bias (or even completely spoil) the result. To protect from this kind of manipulation attacks, protocols must have mechanisms to limit the influence of any particular user (or a possibly coordinated coalition of them) beyond what the function being computed inherently allows. In particular, for the task of real summation, a particular user's influence is at least 1. Note that the maximum possible influence of a particular user in our IKOS protocol from Section 6 is 2n, as a dishonest user could replace their actual input (which should be encoded as an integer in {0, . . . , p} as prescribed by the protocol) by an arbitrary value in Z q . We leave open the question of whether this protocol can be efficiently "patched" to address this issue. Recent work by Cheu et al. [3] studies the issue of manipulation by coalitions of dishonest users in the context of the local model of differential privacy. Their results show that non-interactive protocols in the local model are in a sense manipulable. In particular, for the case of summation a dishonest user can skew the result by Ω(1/ǫ). Intuitively, this is because in the local model (where each user gets privacy independently of the rest) large changes in the input distribution induce only a small change in the distribution of messages observed by the analyzer. Hence, dishonest users inducing small changes in the distribution of messages can induce large changes in the final estimate produced by the analyzer. In contrast, for our recursive protocol from Section 4 the maximum skew a user can induce is 1 + O δ (log log n) 2 n 2/3 ǫ 2
. To see this, note that messages sent by a dishonest user, even if they are anonymized via the shuffer, still need to "typecheck". Hence, even a dishonest user must report m values y 1 , . . . , y m . These values must be in {0, . . . , p j } and {0, . . . , p m + 1}, with precisions p 1 , . . . , p m prescribed by the protocol. Similarly to what happens in the local model, our analyzer debiases the result by scaling each contribution y j by 1/(1 − γ j ). As γ j in our protocol is O δ It is important to remark that dishonest users in the shuffle model can harm privacy by not providing blanketing noise as expected. This is easily achieved by simply sending invalid messages. A straightforward defense is to increase the overall noise by a constant factor that accounts for the maximum fraction of expected misbehaving users.
A Proof of Secure Summation
In this section we give the lemmas required to complete the proof of Theorem 6.1 in Section 6.1.
A.1 Reduction to a single input and shuffling step
To analyze the average-case statistical security of V we start by upper bounding the expected total variation distance between the outputs of two executions with random inputs by a function of single random input.
Lemma A.1. Let V m,n and V ′ m,n denote two independent executions of the m-parallel IKOS protocol. Then we have:
Proof. We first remove the expectation over X ′ by taking its randomness inside the total variation distance (ie. switching from TV | X, X ′ to TV | X ). Note that this is akin to a reverse Jensen inequality, and therefore we will need to pay a factor of 2 to get the result via a triangle inequality. The formal bound is obtained by taking X ′′ to be an independent copy of X ′ and observing that
Next we observe that V = V( X ′ ) has uniform distribution over the tuples in G mn that add up to i X i . We use this information to expand the total variation and write it as an expectation over V as follows:
The final task is to bound the remaining expectation. We start by defining the random variable Z = Z( X, V) := P | X, V [V( X) = V]. Note that because both V( X) and V follow the same uniform distribution over tuples in G mn conditioned to having the same sum, we have
Therefore, the expectation that we need to bound takes the simple form E[|Z − E[Z]|], and can be bounded in terms of E[Z 2 ] via Jensen's inequality:
Now recall that if A, A ′ ∈ A are i.i.d. random variables, then we have
Using this identity we can write the expectation of Z 2 over the randomness in V in terms of the probability that two independent executions of V( X) (conditioned on X) yield the same result:
Putting the pieces together completes the proof:
To further simplify the bound in previous lemma we can write the probability P[V m,n ( X) = V ′ m,n ( X)] in terms of a single permutation step. For that purpose we introduce the notation V m,n = S m,n • R m,n , where:
• R m,n : G n → G nm is the randomized map that given x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) generates the shares (Y
and arranges them in order first by share id and then by user:
• S m,n : G nm → G nm is a random permutation of its inputs obtained by applying m independent shufflers S (j) , j ∈ [m], to the inputs in blocks of n:
S m,n (y It is important to note that S m,n produces random permutations of [mn] which are uniformly distributed in the subgroup of all permutations which arise as the parallel composition of m uniform permutations on [n]. Equipped with these observations, it is straightforward to verify the following identity.
Lemma A.2. Let R m,n and R ′ m,n denote two independent executions of the additive sharing step in V m,n ( X) = S m,n • R m,n . Then we have
Proof. We drop all subscripts for convenience. The result follows directly from the fact that S is uniform over a subgroup of permutations, which implies that the inverse of S and the composition of two independent copies of S both follow the same distribution as S. Thus, we can write:
Putting these two lemmas together yields the following bound.
Lemma A.3. Let V m,n and V ′ m,n denote two independent executions of the m-parallel IKOS protocol. Then we have:
A.2 Reduction to a problem on random graphs Definition A.1. A random n-vertex 2m-regular multigraph G is from the unconditioned permutation model, denoted R * (n, 2m), if it can be constructed as follows. Start with n vertices and no edges. Take a set of m uniformly random and independent permutations of the vertices, denoted {π i } m i=1 . For each vertex v and each index i ∈ [m], add an edge between v and π i (v). We say that G is generated by
Note that G may have self-loops. Let C(G) be number of connected components of a graph G.
Lemma A.4. Let G be drawn from R * (n, 2m), then
Proof. Note that, by the tower law,
Let G S be the unconditioned permutation model graph, with vertex set [n], generated by the m permutations used in S. Note that, it suffices to show that
For notational convenience, we will define a deterministic reordering of R( X) and S• R ′ ( X) as follows. Consider the permutation P : [mn] → [mn]
Define U, U ′ ∈ G mn by U j = R( X) P (j) and U ′ j = P •S • R ′ ( X) P (j) . Note that P is such that the shares from each input are grouped together (in order) in U. Consequently, U ′ groups together collections of m shares, one from the output of each shuffler. Thus it suffices to show that
First we consider values of j that are not divisible by m, i.e. they are not the final share in a group of m. For such a j, we claim p j = q −1 . To see this, condition on X and R ′ , in addition to A 1 , ..., A j−1 . Note that U j and U j+1 only depend upon anything we've conditioned on via their sum. Therefore U j is still uniformly distributed and has probability q −1 of being equal to U ′ j . For an index i ∈ [mn] we define the vertex corresponding to i to be the vertex ⌈i/m⌉, and we define C i to be the set of vertices in the same connected component as this vertex in G S . For the remaining j's, we distinguish the case where the corresponding vertex is the highest index in C j and the case where it isn't.
In the first case,
as the sums have the same summands in a different order. Further,
as they both represent sharings of the same input values and
as we are conditioning on A 1 , ..., A j−1 . Putting these together we can conclude that p j = 1. For the second case, we will find that p j = q −1 . We will show this by showing that if we condition on the value of U j then U ′ j is still uniformly distributed. That is to say that the number of possible outcomes fitting those conditions with each value of U j is independent of that value. To show that these sets of outcomes have the same size we will partition the possible outcomes into sets of size q, with U ′ j taking each value in G exactly once in each set. This will be possible because the structure of G S allows us to change the value of U ′ j and other values to preserve what is being conditioned on in an algebraically principled way. If G = Z q , for some prime q, i.e. the set of possible outcomes forms a vector space, this can be thought of as follows. The space of possible outcomes consitent with the conditions is a subspace of the space of all outcomes. Thus showing that this subspace contains two possible values for U ′ j suffices by the nice algebraic properties of vector spaces. That there is more than one possible value of U ′ j is a consequence of G S "connecting the jth share to later shares". The following paragraphs make this formal in the more general setting of any abelian group G.
Consider the set T of choices of (U · U ′ ) ∈ G 2mn that are consistent with A 1 , ..., A j−1 (and a value of X). We consider the group action of G 2mn on itself by addition. We will show that, there exists a homomorphism G → G 2mn mapping g to u g with the following property. The action of u g on G 2mn fixes T and U j and adds g to U ′ j . Therefore, the equivalence relation, of being equal upto adding u g for some g, partitions T into subsets of size q each containing one value for which A j holds. It follows, from the fact that each entry in T is equally likely, that p j = q −1 .
To find such a homomorphism, note that there is a path in G S from the vertex corresponding to the jth share to a higher index vertex. This is equivalent to saying that there is a sequence (a 1 , b 1 , a 2 , b 2 , ..., a l , b l , a l+1 ) with the following properties. The a i and b i are elements of [mn] and should be interpreted as indexes of G mn . For all i ∈ [l], π(b i ) = a i and b i and a i+1 correspond to the same vertex. We have a 1 = j, b l > j, a i = a i ′ for any i = i ′ , and b i < j for all i < l. Let u g be the element of G 2mn with a g in entries a 2 , ..., a l+1 , b 1 + mn, ..., b l + mn and the identity everywhere else.
Adding u g doesn't change the truth of A 1 , ..., A j−1 because U a i and U ′ a i = R ′ ( X) b i are always incremented together, with the exception of when i = 1 or l + 1 which is fine because then a i ≥ j. In the case of i = 1 this adds g to U ′ j without changing U j . The consistency of the implied values of X is maintained because U a i and R ′ ( X) P (b i−1 ) are always incremented together and affect the X implied by U the same as that implied by R ′ ( X). Thus, this u g has the properties we claimed and p j = q −1 .
Tying this together we have that .
Therefore, We now bound this expression, using the induction hypothesis, to find that
To complete the proof it suffices to show that this sum on the right is at most 1.5e m−1 . Call the sth summand from this sum a s . We separate the summands into three cases, depending on whether s is greater than n/10 and/or less than 3n/4. Firsty, if s ≤ n/10, then Thus we can bound the early summands with a geometric series as follows. Applying Sterling's bound, √ 2πn n+ 1 2 e −n ≤ n! ≤ en n+ 1 2 e −n , to the factorials in the above expression bounds it above by, As n ≥ 19 and c ≤ n/4, this is maximised for c = 3, and as we also have m ≥ 3 this results in the bound 9 8 Where the inequality holds because (1 − α) ≤ 1 and, for any summand that appears in the sum, 2.5 − c + (1 − α)n > 0. The final expression is maximised for α = 3/4 and there are fewer than 3n/5 summands with n/10 < s < 3n/4. Therefore the sum of all of these terms can be bounded by, Where we have used that m ≥ 3 and n ≥ 19. Adding these up the sum as a whole is bounded by 8 7 e m−1 + 1 + (1.27) m−1 < 1.5e m−1 .
To conclude the proof we consider the expectation. Below we apply the definition of expectation with the bound on the probability above. Notice that every term after the second is at most qe m−1 2n m−1 times the previous term, thus 
B The Original IKOS Proof
In this section we provide a proof of Lemma 5.1, all the ideas for the proof are provided in [12] but we reproduce the proof here keeping track of constants to facilitate setting parameters of the protocol. The following definition and lemma from [11] are fundamental to why this protocol is secure. Let H be a family of functions mapping {0, 1} n to {0, 1} l . We say H is universal or a universal family of hash functions if, for h selected uniformly at random from H, for every x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , x = y, P[h(x) = h(y)] = 2 −l .
Lemma B.1 (Leftover Hash Lemma (special case)). Let D ⊂ {0, 1} n , s > 0, |D| ≥ 2 l+2s and let H be a universal family of hash functions mapping n bits to l bits. Let h, d and U be chosen independently uniformly at random from H, D and {0, 1} l respectively. Then TV ((h, h(d)), (h, U)) ≤ 2 −s
To begin with we consider the case of securely adding two uniformly random inputs X, Y ∈ Z q . Recall that Π is the protocol of the statement of the lemma, and let V (x, y) be shorthand for M R Π ((x, y)) = S • R Π ((x, y)), i.e. the view of the analyzer in an execution of protocol Π with inputs x, y. We write V for V (X, Y ) and V (x) for V (x, Y ). Finally let U be an independent uniformly random element of Z q . m to Z q . Let d be an independent uniformly random element of [2m] m . Note that (V, h V (d)) has the same distribution as (V, X), which follows from the intuition that V corresponds to 2m random numbers shuffled together, and x can be obtained by adding up m of them, and letting y be the sum of the rest.
The result now follows immediately from the fact that the Leftover Hash Lemma implies that TV((V, h v (d)), (V, U)) ≤ 2 −s . Now we can use this to solve the case of two arbitrary inputs. and so for every x, y, x ′ ∈ Z q and y ′ = y + x − x ′ we have TV(V (x, y), V (x ′ , y ′ )) ≤ qTV(V (x), V (x ′ )).
Combining the last two inequalities gives the result.
Combining these two lemmas gives that, for x, y, x ′ , y ′ ∈ Z q such that x + y = x ′ + y ′ ,
From which the following lemma is immediate 
C Technical Lemmas
Randomized rounding. Our protocols use a fixed point encoding of a real number x with integer precision p > 0 and randomized rounding, which we define as fp(x, p) = ⌊xp⌋ + Ber(xp − ⌊xp⌋). We note this rounding is unbiased in the sense that E[fp(x, p)]/p = x. The following lemma provides a simple bound on the MSE of this operation.
Lemma C.1. For any x ∈ R n , MSE( n i=1 fp(x i , p)/p, n i=1 x i ) ≤ n/(4p 2 ).
Proof. Let ∆ i be fp(x i , p)/p − x i , and note that |∆ i | ≤ 1/p and E(∆ i ) = 0. It follows that
Differential privacy from total variation distance. The following lemma (also stated by Wang et al. [15] , Proposition 3) provides a convenient method to obtain differential privacy guarantees by comparing the output distributions two protocols in terms of total variation distance. Recall that the total variation distance between two random variables X and Y can be defined as TV(X, Y) = 
